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PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THIS APPEAL 
This appeal was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals 
for disposition by order of the Utah Supreme Court dated August 
21, 1992. This appeal is a consolidated appeal of two 
previously separate appeals, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Commission, Supreme Court No. 92-00012, and Amoco Oil 
Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, Supreme Court No. 92-
00013. By order of the Utah Supreme Court dated June 1, 1992, 
these two appeals were consolidated into the current appeal now 
before the Court of Appeals. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. ("Chevron") and Amoco Oil Company 
("Amoco") are appealing the Utah State Tax Commission's central 
assessment of 1989 property taxes against their respective Salt 
Lake City refineries. The Tax Commission held that the 
refineries are appurtenant to the hundreds of oil wells that 
supply them with crude oil, and therefore are subject to central 
assessment under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-201(1)(d). In 1989, that 
statute provided:1 
(1) By May 1 the following property shall be assessed 
by the commission at 100% of fair market value, as valued on 
January 1, in accordance with this chapter: 
(c) all mines and mining claims...; 
(d) all machinery used in mining, all property 
or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines 
or mining claims, and the value of any surface use 
made of mining claims or mining property for other 
than mining purposes. For the purposes of assessment 
and taxation, all processing plants, mills, reduction 
works, and smelters which are primarily used by the 
1
 The statute was amended in 1990 to add current sections (c) 
and (d). Former §§ 59-2-201(1)(c) and (d) were redesignated § 59-
2-201(e) and (f) respectively, but remained substantively 
unchanged. L. 1990, ch. 41, § 2. All citations are to the statute 
as it existed in 1989. 
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owner of a mine or mining claim for processing, 
reducing, or smelting minerals taken from a mine or 
mining claim, shall be considered appurtenant to that 
mine or mining claim, regardless of actual 
location..,. (Emphasis added). 
The Tax Commission held that the refineries were in 
fact surface improvements appurtenant to "mines" (i.e. oil 
wells) on the basis of the Utah Supreme Court's discussion of 
appurtenances in Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
796 P. 2d 1256 (Utah 1990).2 Chevron and Amoco contend that 
the Amax decision is factually far different from the current 
situation, and that the Tax Commission's interpretation of the 
statutory term "appurtenant" is not in accordance with the 
accepted meaning of the term, requiring reversal of the Tax 
Commission's decision. 
Although the Tax Commission decision did not rely upon 
the second sentence of § 59-2-201(1)(d), the Tax Commission and 
respondents Salt Lake and Davis Counties (the "Counties") now 
fall back upon this provision, arguing that it constitutes the 
Utah legislature's intended definition of the term 
"appurtenant••• The Respondents argue in their briefs that, 
2
 Chevron R. 9; Amoco R. 9. Because the Amoco and Chevron 
proceedings were not consolidated until they reached the Supreme 
Court, two separate records exist in this appeal- Citations are to 
the individual records. 
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because more than 50% of the refinery feedstocks used by Chevron 
and Amoco were composed of oil produced from their affiliated 
companies' interests in various oil wells, the refineries must 
be deemed appurtenant to those wells. The respondents' argument 
stretches the statute far beyond its clear language, which by 
its terms includes only processing plants associated with a 
particular mine, not hundreds of scattered oil wells that 
individually supply only tiny fractions of the refineries' 
feedstocks. 
Chevron and Amoco contend that even if their 
refineries could be centrally assessed under § 59-2-201, the Tax 
Commission erred in not extending them the 20% deduction for 
intangible expenses formerly provided for locally-assessed 
property by Utah Code Ann, § 59-2-304 (repealed). Failure to 
give Chevron and Amoco the 20% deduction for intangible expenses 
while maintaining the deduction for locally-assessed refineries 
results in unconstitutional non-uniformity and inequality of 
assessment between virtually identical properties, and 
prejudices them with regard to their competitors. 
Contrary to the arguments of the Tax Commission and 
the Counties, the record in this proceeding reflects substantial 
evidence of the two necessary elements of this claim. First, 
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the record reflects that the Tax Commission's central assessment 
of the refineries used an assessment method identical to that 
used by the counties. Second, the record shows that the Tax 
Commission's failure to give Chevron and Amoco the 20% valuation 
discount then available to locally-assessed petroleum refineries 
caused them competitive harm vis a vis their locally-assessed 
competitors. Under these circumstances, the Tax Commission was 
constitutionally required to grant them the 20% discount under 
the Supreme Court's decision in Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 796 P. 2d 1256 (Utah 1990). 
II. 
THE REFINERIES CANNOT BE DEEMED APPURTENANT 
TO MULTIPLE WELLS 
The Tax Commission held that the Chevron and Amoco 
refineries were actually appurtenant to the hundreds of wells 
producing oil used by them, based upon the Utah Supreme Court's 
discussion of the appurtenance issue in Amax Magnesium Corp. v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, supra.3 In ruling as it did, the 
Tax Commission disregarded the generally accepted definition of 
3
 Chevron R. 9; Amoco R. 9. 
-4-
an appurtenance as something that is an incident to a principal 
property, necessarily connected with the use and enjoyment of 
the principal, and that passes with a conveyance of the 
principal. Black's Law Dictionary 94 (5th Ed. 1979); Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-12. 
Both Chevron and Amoco presented uncontested evidence 
at the formal hearing establishing a number of important facts: 
(1) no single well or field, of the hundreds involved, supplied 
the majority of feedstock used by either refinery* and most 
supplied only tiny fractions of the oil used by the refineries; 
(2) the refineries were owned and operated by separate divisions 
(in Chevron's case) or corporations (in Amoco's case) from the 
entities owning the oil produced from the subject wells; (3) the 
companies generally did not own entire oil wells, but rather 
owned fractional working interests in the wells, which were 
often operated by third parties; (4) the refineries received oil 
by truck and pipelines operated by unrelated entities as well as 
by pipelines operated by the companies' affiliates; and (5) the 
refineries and wells were capable of profitable operation 
without reference to each other, and were in fact operated 
independently. As more fully set forth in Chevron and Amoco's 
principal briefs, these facts are incompatible with a finding of 
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appurtenance under the Amax court's discussion of appurtenance 
or otherwise. 
Faced with undisputed evidence that the refineries 
were not appurtenant to the wells under the normal 
interpretation of that term, the Tax Commission and the Counties 
fall back upon the second sentence of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
201(1)(d). This provision does not support the Tax Commission's 
decision in favor of central assessment. The second sentence of 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201(1)(d) by its terms applies only when a 
processing plant is primarily used by the owner of a, mine to 
process materials from the mine.4 More importantly, the 
processing plant is then considered appurtenant to that mine. 
The Respondents claim that this language permits the refineries 
to be considered appurtenant to hundreds of individual wells in 
three states. The statute in fact makes no provision for a 
plant being appurtenant to multiple mines. The statute's 
literal terms exclude its application to Chevron and Amoco. 
A
 There was undisputed evidence at the formal hearing that 
Amoco Oil Company, the owner of the Amoco refinery, did not own the 
"Amoco" wells in question, which were owned and operated by a 
separate corporation, Amoco Production Company. In Chevron's case, 
the wells were owned and operated by an entirely separate division 
of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. Because the second sentence of § 59-2-
201(d) requires common ownership of the mine and plant, this fact 
provides an alternative basis for a decision against central 
assessment. 
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The Respondents argue the Court of Appeals should 
disregard the Utah legislature's use of the singular in the 
second sentence of § 59-2-201(d), because the first sentence of 
that section states that surface improvements appurtenant to 
"mines" are to be centrally assessed. The two uses are not 
inconsistent. As a general matter, surface improvements 
appurtenant to mines are centrally assessed. Where a particular 
facility primarily processes minerals from a single mine; 
however, it can be considered appurtenant only to that mine even 
if not otherwise appurtenant. The legislature's use of the 
plural to state a general rule, and the singular in a specific 
situation, is completely consistent, and does not prevent the 
statute from being construed as a whole. The Court must assume 
in this situation that the legislature used this language 
advisedly, and interpret the statute in accordance with its 
literal terms. Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 811 P. 2d 664 (Utah 1991). Interpretation of tax 
statutes is a question of law, and the reviewing court need give 
no deference to the Tax Commission's interpretations. ,Id; see 
also Oaden Union Rv. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 395 P. 2d 57 (Utah 
1964)(ambiguous statutes to be construed against taxing 
authority). 
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The Respondents also err in their contention that 
the second sentence of § 59-2-201(1)(d) contains the legislative 
definition of "appurtenant." The Respondents argue that this 
"definition" indicates a legislative intent that the common law 
meaning of "appurtenant" not apply. The second sentence of this 
section is not a definition, but rather an alternative ground 
for central assessment. The statute allows central assessment 
in two circumstances. The first circumstance is when a surface 
improvement actually is appurtenant to a mine. Alternatively, 
under the second sentence of § 59-2-201(1)(d), when a processing 
plant is used primarily in connection with a mine, it is 
statutorily considered appurtenant to that mine. Even were the 
second sentence of § 59-2-201(1)(d) applicable here, it does not 
evidence legislative intent to broaden the definition of 
appurtenance. 
The respondents' arguments have a number of other 
problems. The Tax Commission argues that a refinery can be 
appurtenant to hundreds of separate fractional interests in 
various wells. However, the legislature's use of the singular 
in the second sentence of § 59-2-201(1)(d) reflects a basic 
principle of property law — that an appurtenance, because of 
its subordinate nature, can be appurtenant to only one other 
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property. This principle was recognized by the Utah legislature 
in Utah Code Ann, § 57-1-12, which provides that an appurtenance 
passes with a conveyance of the principal property, even if not 
listed in the conveyance. In this case, sales of individual 
wells and fields (to which the refineries are ostensibly 
appurtenant) are made regularly, obviously without a concurrent 
transfer of the refineries. The Tax Commission has attempted to 
stretch the statute to fit a situation to which it was not 
intended. If the statute is truly construed as a whole, as it 
should be, then it is clear that the refineries cannot be 
considered appurtenant to the wells in question. 
III. 
THE CHEVRON REFINERY IS NOT SUBJECT TO 
CENTRAL ASSESSMENT UNDER UTAH CODE ANN, S 
59-2-201(1)(A). 
The respondents argue that Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
201(1)(a) permits central assessment of Chevron's refinery. 
This section provides for central assessment of: 
(a) all property which operates as a unit 
across county lines, if the values must be 
apportioned among more than one county or 
Sudu6 .... 
The respondents assert that, because a small portion 
of the Chevron refinery property overlaps the Salt Lake County 
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line, this section applies, without further analysis of whether 
the statutory conditions for central assessment have been met. 
The record reflects that the portions of the Chevron 
refinery lying in Salt Lake County - a driveway and the visitor 
parking strip - were separately assessed by Salt Lake County for 
years prior to 1989.5 In applying § 59-2-201(1)(a) for 1989, 
the Tax Commission failed to make any finding that the values 
must be apportioned among more than one county. Chevron R. 7-8. 
The statute requires this element before central assessment is 
proper. 
The term "apportionment" in tax statutes implies more 
than simply determining the value of property in a given 
geographic area; apportionment is instead the process of 
dividing an indivisible unit value among geographic areas. 
Southern Pacific Trans. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 732 P. 2d 
18, 23 (Oregon 1987). In Chevron's situation, there is no need 
for apportionment of values among more than one county. The 
portion of the property in Salt Lake County is a discrete parcel 
which had easily been assessed by the Salt Lake County Assessor 
5
 As Chevron noted in its principal brief, this basis for 
central assessment was never raised by the Property Tax Division at 
any time prior to the formal hearing of Chevron's Petition for 
Redetermination of the 1989 assessment. Chevron T. 9-13. 
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for years. This is not the factual circumstance for which the 
statute was intended - an indivisible operation such as a 
railroad or pipeline, for which local assessments of an 
indivisible whole are impractical. Southern Pacific, supra. No 
apportionment of values is necessary because the parcels in each 
county can be assessed individually. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
201(1)(a) does not apply. 
IV. 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS IN THE RECORD TO 
OVERTURN THE TAX COMMISSION'S DECISION NOT 
TO GRANT THE REFINERIES THE STATUTORY 20% 
DISCOUNT FOR LOCALLY-ASSESSED PROPERTIES. 
In 1989, locally assessed property within the state of 
Utah received a 20% discount on assessed valuation for 
intangible expenses incurred in the sale of such property. Utah 
Code Ann. Section 59-2-304 (1989 Supp.)(repealed). Centrally-
assessed properties did not receive this discount. The evidence 
at the Tax Commission's formal hearings showed that central 
assessment caused Chevron and Amoco to bear a higher property 
tax burden than their locally assessed competitors, with 
resultant competitive damage. Chevron and Amoco contend that 
the Tax Commission's failure to grant them the 20% discount 
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violated Utah's statutory and constitutional requirements of 
uniform taxation. Utah Const., Article XIII, § 3(1); Utah Code 
Ann. Section 59-2-103 (1989 Supp.) 
After the Tax Commission's formal hearing in this 
matter, the Utah Supreme Court required the Tax Commission to 
give a centrally-assessed taxpayer the 20% discount where local 
and central assessment methods were similar. Amax Magnesium 
Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 796 P. 2d 1256 (Utah 1990). 
The respondents seek to distinguish Amax from this case by 
contending that Chevron and Amoco presented insufficient 
evidence on the issue of uniformity. 
Both respondents quote language from Amax in their 
briefs, listing requirements set forth by the Utah Supreme Court 
in a prior decision, Rio Alqom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P. 
2d 184, 192 (Utah 1984). The respondents claim that Chevron and 
Amoco did not present sufficient evidence concerning these 
requirements. However, the respondents fail to note that the 
Amax court, in the next paragraph, specifically distinguished 
these requirements where it was shown that similar valuation 
methods were used by both the state and county assessors. 796 P. 
2d at 1260. The Supreme Court went on to state: 
It strains reason to assert that if 
assessors using the cost and market 
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appraisal methods overvalue county 
properties, the same overvaluation would not 
occur with state properties assessed by the 
same methods. Assuming that the legislature 
was correct in determining that the market 
value appraisal method overvalues property 
by 20 percent, it would be unconstitutional 
to apply [the 20% discount] to county-
assessed properties and not to state-
assessed properties, 796 P. 2d at 1260. 
Under Amax, all Amoco and Chevron need to show to 
prove an unconstitutional lack of uniformity between their 
centrally-assessed refineries and locally-assessed refineries is 
that the Tax Commission used the same assessment methods in the 
central assessment as those used by the Counties. The 
appellants did so, providing testimony that both the County 
Assessors and the Tax Commission used the same depreciated cost 
valuation method. Chevron T. 17; Amoco T. 11; Supplemental 
Record. In fact, as the Tax Commission was aware, the Tax 
Commission had used the affidavits of valuation submitted by 
Chevron and Amoco for 1989 to the County Assessors for the 
central assessment. In other words, not only were the 
assessment methods the same, but the Tax Commission and the 
County actually used the same assessments. Chevron T. 17; 
Supplemental Record. The companies met their burden of proof 
under Amax to show non-uniformity of taxation between their own 
centrally-assessed refineries and their locally-assessed 
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competitors. 
The respondents also seek to divert the court's 
attention by arguing that Chevron and Amoco were classed 
separately from locally-assessed refineries because they used 
primarily their own oil, and that there was uniform treatment 
within that class of refineries. This argument fails because 
the Tax Commission reached the same conclusion as to value for 
the refineries under central assessment as that reached by the 
Counties under local assessment, because it used the same 
appraisal methods. The difference in taxation resulted solely 
from its failure to apply Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-304 (1989 
Supp.)(repealed) to those identical values. The Tax Commission 
cannot credibly assert that the Chevron and Amoco refineries 
should be classified separately from, and valued more highly 
than their locally-assessed competitors, when it has reached the 
same conclusions of underlying value for both centrally and 
locally assessed properties. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tax Commission seeks to tax Chevron and Amoco at a 
higher rate than locally-assessed refineries in direct 
competition with them. There is no statutory basis here for 
central assessment of either refinery. Even if there were, 
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central assessment results in an unconstitutional non-uniformity 
of taxation. Chevron and Amoco are entitled to a level playing 
field with their competitors. The Tax Commission's decision 
should be reversed. 
DATED this >f day of August, 1992. 
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